Nuclear Weapons Deterrence and Nuclear Latency

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Canada is in a position that it had not fully anticipated or expected, vis a vis the United States. Very few Canadian politicians or military experts, I believe, assumed that America would suddenly turn from Ally to enemy within a single administration’s creation in America.

Yet, that is where we now reside.

In response, Canada, in concert with Poland, and after talks with the French and the British, now need to consider the reality for a future that reverses Canada’s commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Canada’s crossroads, in relation to its future with the United States has already been crossed. Canada will stand with Europe and the U.K. in the future, and accessing American weapons systems, and their ability to deliver nuclear weapons, is unlikely.

I believe Canada will not completely turn its back on the F-35 fighter aircraft, but it won’t pursue any further purchases, once it receives the first 16 aircraft that it has already paid for.

Canada needs to consider the alternative nuclear weapons delivery system in the air, points to the acquisition of the Dassault Rafale aircraft, which constitutes one-half of the French military’s nuclear deterrent force. Dassault has stated that it is committed to doubling the speed with which it can fill orders for the aircraft, and once that fact is assured, it is possible that Canada will go that route, as it offers a nuclear weapons capability completely separate from the United States.

The other leg of nuclear deterrence is one which Canada is now appraising, and that entails SSBN, SBN or SBGN submarines. The difference being whether the submarines in question deliver either nuclear weapons via either ballistic missile or cruise guided missiles.

Two particular manufacturers produce either an AIP or air independent propulsion designed submarine, or a pure nuclear submarine, which in both cases can deliver either ballistic missiles or guided cruise missiles with nuclear warheads.

Each offers benefits, however costs are extremely high for the SSBN platform vs a SSGN AIP submarine. Both France, the U.K., and Japan offer Canada SSBN platforms, independent of the United States. As for the SSGN platform combining AIP design, Sweden, Korea, France and Germany all offer highly capable platforms with the edge now leaning on either the Korean or Japanese designs.

One thing is certain.

America, will not be providing the weapons systems as they pose a threat to Canadian sovereignty.

Canada, in the future, and going forward for the foreseeable future, will no longer find its defence strategy in lock-step with America.

Canada’s future lies in its relationships with those countries that are allies in Europe, the U.K., Japan and Korea, and as such, Canada’s procurement and trade will encompass the countries that are true democracies and aligned with Canadian interests.

America is not dependable in the future, and Canada will seek to protect Canadian sovereignty, including substantively lowering Canada’s nuclear weapons latency and availability. Purchasing deployable systems and/or developing them internally is now a serious consideration.

Having the necessary delivery platforms for nuclear deterrence is beyond a consideration. Canada has the capacity, means, skill and production capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.

It now needs to ensure that it has the platforms for delivery, and will do so in the coming years.

Canadian sovereignty demands it.


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